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Abstract
This paper explores the e¤ect of time varying velocity in a
transition to price stability. Nonstationary velocity, expressed as
function of consumption, is made endogenous in Irelands (1997)
model. We nd that the disinationary booms found by Ball
(1994) may or may not disappear; and also that temporary output
losses may be much larger than previously thought, depending
on velocity. A gradual disination of low ination may even be
undesirable given its overall negative impact on the economy.
Finally, we explore the optimal speed of disination.
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1 Introduction
This paper explores the e¤ect of time varying velocity on the output
response to a disinationary monetary policy and on the optimal speed
of disination. The analysis takes place in an environment where the
supply-side of the economy is characterized by monopolistically compet-
itive rms and where there is rigidity in the setting of prices. The mon-
etary policymakers are committed to price stability in the strict sense
of achieving and maintaining a constant price level. This environment is
familiar from the recent body of research on monetary contractions; and
this research has provided a number of insights. Important amongst
these insights is, rstly, the result that following a contraction in the
money supply, real output initially declines below its new long run equi-
librium level. Secondly, and more striking, it has been found that a
gradual disination may actually result in a temporary output boom
(after an early decline) since output is rising above its new steady state
level. Furthermore, it seems that it is optimal to end high inations
quickly and low inations gradually. Key papers that develop these re-
sults are Ball (1994), Ireland (1997), King and Wollman (1999), and
Khan, King and Wollman (2003).
Since the output e¤ects of monetary contractions and the optimal
speed of disination are of rst order policy importance, it is not sur-
prising that there should be interest in exploring the robustness of these
results to relaxation of key assumptions. For example, Nicolae and Nolan
(2006) relax the assumption of perfect credibility. They demonstrate
that the so-called disinationary boomsmay or may not disappear in
an environment characterized by imperfect credibility, depending on the
speed of learning relative to the speed of disination.
In this paper we focus on relaxing the assumption that velocity is
constant over the entire time horizon of disination. It is well known
that velocity is not a constant. As long ago as the mid 1960s, Mundell
(1965) wrote that: [t]he simplest hypothesis that velocity is constant, is
clearly inadmissible when di¤erent rates of ination are involved. The
current consensus on velocity, supported by numerous empirical studies
over the years, including Gould and Nelson (1974) and Friedman and
Kuttner (1992), is that velocity displays nonstationary behavior.
To introduce time varying velocity to the model used here, we em-
ploy a nonlinear relation between velocity and real consumption. In
doing this, we have drawn on the money and business cycle literature
which endogenizes money velocity in models with shocks to the goods
sector, productivity and the money supply. For example, we highlight
from Cooley and Hansen (1995) that monetary aggregates and velocity
are procyclical. We also draw on empirical evidence from the money
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demand literature that aggregate consumption, rather than income, is
the preferred proxy for the scale variable (see for example Mankiw and
Summers, 1986). The specic form of the relationship used here cap-
tures velocity as a nonstationary variable and nests constant velocity as
a special case. This functional form has theoretical as well as empir-
ical support (see, for example Basu and Dua (1996), Basu and Salyer
(2001)).
We nd that the introduction of time-varying velocity forces us to
modify our thinking about policies for stopping ination. The next sec-
tion of this paper presents the model and the parameter values used in
model calibration. Section 3 presents benchmark results familiar from
the existing literature showing the output response to immediate and
gradual disinations when velocity is constant. Section 4 analyses the
output responses to disination when velocity is time varying. Section
5 discusses the optimal speed of disination for the case of time varying
velocity and section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
2.1 The Representative Agent
The framework employed for this analysis extends the model devel-
oped in Ireland (1997), the component parts of which are now familiar
in the literature. The economy consists of many identical consumers.
Each period a representative agent makes plans for consumption and
leisure/labour such that (expected) present discounted value of utility is
maximised. This measure of utility is given by
1X
t=0
t

C1 t   1
1     Nt

;  > 0; (1)
and is separable in consumption, Ct, and labour supply, Nt;  2 (0; 1)
is a discount factor and  is the disutility of work Following Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977), Ct is dened over a continuum of goods,
Ct =
Z 1
0
ct(i)
b 1
b di
 b
b 1
b > 0;
where ct(i) denotes, in equilibrium, the number of units of each good
i from rm i that the representative agent consumes. b is the price
elasticity of demand. The Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate price level, Pt; at
time t is given by:
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Pt =
Z 1
0
pt(i)
1 bdi
 1
1 b
;
where pt(i) is the nominal price at which rm i must sell output on
demand during time t.
Labour supply, Nt is given by:
Nt =
Z 1
0
nt (i) di;
where nt(i) denotes the quantity of labour supplied by the household to
each rm i, at the nominal wage Wt, during each period. This means
that households e¤ectively supply a portion of labour to all rms which,
together with (2) below ensures that the marginal utility of wealth equal-
izes across agents.
Each period, the representative agent faces a budget constraint of
the following sort:Z 1
0
[Qt (i) st 1 (i) + t (i) +Wtnt (i)] di 
Z 1
0
[pt (i) ct (i) +Qt (i) st (i)] di:
(2)
Qt (i) denotes the nominal price of a share in rm i, st denotes the
quantity of shares, t (i) di = Dt(i)st(i), where Dt(i) is the dividend
associated with a unit share, and
R 1
0
pt (i) ct (i) di = PtCt denotes total
nominal expenditure. We assume that for t = 0; s 1(i) = 1; for all
i 2 [0; 1] thereby assuming that each household owns an equal share of
all the rms. Equation (2) says that each period income (nancial plus
labour) can be worth no less then the value of expenditure (on non-
durable consumption plus nancial investment). The household prob-
lem, then, is to choose ct(i); nt(i); st(i) so as to maximize (1) subject to
the sequence of constraints (2), and the relevant initial and transversal-
ity conditions. Optimal household behaviour is described by the require-
ment that household consumption spending must be optimally allocated
across di¤erentiated goods at each point in time (i.e., the optimal ct(i)).
It can be shown that the Dixit-Stiglitz preference relation requires that
purchases of each good i satises:
ct(i) = Ct

pt(i)
Pt
 b
: (3)
Ireland (1997) simplies his analysis by letting the aggregate nomi-
nal magnitudes be determined in equilibrium by a quantity-theory type
relation with an assumed constant velocity of circulation. Specically,
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Irelands quantity equation is
MtVt =
Z 1
0
pt (i) ct (i) di = PtCt:
where Vt (= 1) is the velocity of circulation.
A constant velocity of circulation is, arguably, a somewhat strong
assumption and one that we seek to relax here. One way to permit
velocity to vary in this model is to present it as:
Vt = 
C

t ;  2 [0; 1) (4)
where  captures the degree of velocity circulation1. This is a nonlinear
relation between velocity and real consumption and draws on the work of,
for example, Cooley and Hansen (1995), Mankiw and Summers (1986),
Basu and Dua (1996) and Basu and Salyer (2001)2. Importantly, velocity
is now nonstationary and endogenous to the model. Irelands case of a
constant velocity is nested as a special case (for  = 0). For any value
of  2 (0; 1) velocity is time varying.
The quantity-theory type relation can now be written:
Mt = PtC
1 
t (5)
An interior optimum for the agents problem will include (2) with
equality, (3) for all i, (5) and the following conditions:
C t = tPt; (6)
 = tWt: (7)
Wt = PtC

t (8)
And for all i
Qt(i) = Dt(i) + (t+1=t)Qt+1(i); (9)
where t is an unknown multiplier associated with (2).
1For simplicity 
 is here set equal to unity.
2A full explanation of the microfundations of this velocity function is an interesting
exercise in its own right but is beyond the scope of the current paper.
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2.2 The Corporate Sector
The corporate sector is modelled as in Ireland (1997) and Nicolae and
Nolan (2006). The supply-side of the economy consists of monopolisti-
cally competitive rms and there is price rigidity. There is a continuum
of rms indexed by i over the unit interval, each of them producing a
di¤erent, perishable consumption good. So, goods may also be indexed
by i 2 [0; 1], where rm i produces good i.
Each rm i sells shares, at the beginning of each period t, at the nom-
inal price Qt(i), and pays, at the end of the period, the nominal dividend
Dt(i). The representative household trades the number of shares that
it owns, st(i), in each of the rms at the end of each period t. Under
market clearing, st(i) = 1;8i 2 [0; 1]; in each period. Firms are able to
change prices each period, subject to a xed cost. As a consequence,
in equilibrium, rms will not necessarily be willing to change prices in
each period. The criterion for the price-setting decision at time t is to
maximise the return to shareholders.
At time t we assume that rms are divided into two categories, such
that rms from the rst category can freely change their prices, p1;t(i),
while the rms belonging to the second must sell output at the same
price set a period before, p2;t(i) = p2;t 1(i); unless they pay the xed
cost k > 0, measured in terms of labour. We may think of this cost as
being associated with information collection and decision making. At
time t + 1, the roles are reversed and the rst set of rms keeps prices
unchanged, p1;t+1(i) = p1;t(i) unless they are willing to pay the xed cost
k; while the second set of rms can freely set new prices.
The model assumes, then, that rms are constantly re-evaluating
their pricing strategy, weighing the benets of holding prices xed ver-
sus the alternative of changing prices and incurring the xed penalty.
However at moment t the rms belonging to the set of rms that can
freely change price are able to choose between two strategies, depending
on whether the ination rate is moderate or high. At moderate rates
of ination, or in the face of gradual changes in the monetary stance,
they are more likely to keep their prices constant for two periods and
hence avoid the cost k (single price strategy). On the other hand, in the
case of a high ination, or in the face of sharp changes in the monetary
stance, rms are more likely to choose a new price and pay the cost k
(two price strategy).
We assume a simple linear production technology yt(i) = lt(i), where
yt(i) and lt(i) are the output of rm i and the labour used to produce it,
respectively. Let us denote aggregate output as Yt: Equilibrium prots
at time t for rm i are given by
6
Dt(i) = [pt(i) Wt (i)]

pt (i)
Mt
 b
C
1 b(1 )
t   It(i)Wt(i)k: (10)
while, in equilibrium, the units of labour supplied to each rm at nominal
wage Wt are given by:
nt(i) = Y
1 b(1 )
t

pt (i)
Mt
 b
+ It(i)Wt(i)k;
where
It(i) =

1; if the rm pays the cost of price adjustment k at moment t;
0; if the rm does not pay the cost k at moment t:
Irelands paper makes a clear distinction between the two price strate-
gies agents follow, each depends on the level of ination. When ination
is low, the single price strategy is employed, which means that agents
are happy to keep prices unchanged for two consecutive periods of time.
When ination is high, they follow the two price strategy which means
that they are changing prices every period, as these are getting eroded
by the high ination.
2.3 Single price strategy
Under this strategy we may think of rm i choosing pt(i) so as to max-
imize the following expression:
t(i) = Dt(i) + 

t+1
t

Dt+1(i); (11)
which follows from (9), and implies that prices are set to maximize mar-
ket value. We then substitute (6), (7), the quantity theory type equation
(5) and goods market equilibrium (3) into (10). It then follows that the
price for rm i that will be used for two consecutive time periods is:
pt(i) =
b
b  1
M bt Y
1 b(1 )
t + M
b
t+1Y
1 b(1 )
t+1
M b 1t Y
2 b(1 )  
t + M
b 1
t+1 Y
2 b(1 )  
t+1
: (12)
This equation is familiar from the New Keynesian economics literature.
It basically says that the optimal price is a function of current and future
anticipated demand and costs conditions, and that in steady state, price
is a xed mark-up over marginal costs. As is familiar in models of mo-
nopolistic competition based on Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, the markup
is constant and determined by the elasticity of demand (that is, it is tied
down via the preference side of the model): the lower the elasticity, the
higher the mark-up.
7
2.4 Two Price Strategy
In this case the rm chooses the price pt(i) to maximise prots in each
period
t(i) = Dt(i): (13)
The optimising price in this case is given by:
pt(i) =
b
b  1
Mt
Y 1  t
: (14)
Here we see that prices are a mark-up as before but now only current
period demand and cost conditions are relevant.
2.5 The Steady-State
The steady state equilibria exist when money growth is constant (t =
), for all t. Real money balances are also constant, so from (5) we
have that (Ct = C), for all t. The steady-state velocity is constant too,
V = 
C: Steady-state output is not a function of velocity either for the
single price strategy
Y =
 
b  1
b
1

1 + b 1
1 + b

2
1 + 1 b
 1
1 b
! 1

or for the two price strategy
Y =



b  1
b
 1

These relations are essentially those in Ireland (1997) 3.
2.6 Monetary Policy
We dene a disinationary policy following the approach adopted by
Ball (1994), Ireland (1997) and Nicolae and Nolan (2006). The monetary
policy brings money growth to zero over some time horizon. Specically,
at period 0, the authorities make a surprise announcement about the
path for the money supply, fMtgTt=0 ; such that by time period T ination
will be zero. This announced path for the money supply, in turn, implies
a gradual decrease in the growth rate of the money supply. Let t denote
the growth rate of the money stock at time t. We study, then, processes
for the money growth rate of the following sort:
t = t 1      1
T
; (15)
3Setting  = 1 and 
 = 1 we obtain Ireland (1997) equations (14).
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for any value of t from 0 to T   1, where  1 is equal to the initial rate
of ination, and where t > T = 1. So, a horizon of time T = 1 entails
immediate disination, while for T > 1 the policymakers engineer a more
gradual path towards price stability.
2.7 Model Calibration
In this section we calibrate the model in order to explore the output e¤ect
of active monetary policy designed to bring down ination. To facilitate
comparison with the existing literature, we set parameter values used in
that broader literature and adopt the model calibration used in Ireland
(1997). For ease of reference, Table 1 sets out the parameter values used
in the calibration. As is evident from the table, we allow  to take a
number of di¤erent values in order to explore the e¤ect of time varying
velocity on output (Irelands case ( = 0) is a special case of the work
carried out here).
Parameter Value Description
 0:1 intertemporal elasticity of substitution;
(as in Ball, Mankiw and Romer, 1988)
b 6 price elasticity of demand;
(as in Rotemberg and Woodford, 1992)
k 0:1075 cost of price adjustment; (as in Ireland, 1997)
 0:97 discount factor; each interval of time
corresponds to 6 months;
(as in Ball and Mankiw, 1994)
 1 degree of disutility from work;
(as in Nicolae and Nolan ,2006)
 [0; 1) degree of velocity of circulation
Table 1. Parameter values used in the model calibration.
In the following section, we present benchmark results from the exist-
ing literature. These describe the behaviour of output during immediate
and gradual disinations starting from both low and high initial ination
rates; and where velocity is assumed constant. The subsequent section
9
presents the behaviour of output for all of these same cases but when
velocity is assmed to be time varying.
3 Benchmark Results
This section presents results familiar from the literature for the specic
case where velocity is assumed constant.
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Figure 1: Output E¤ect of Irelands (1997) Immediate Disination of
Small(3%) Initial Annual Ination Rate and Big(200%) Initial An-
nual Ination Rate.
Figure 1 demonstrates the results: i) that immediate (T = 1) dis-
ination from a low (3%) ination rate brings about a signicant early
output loss (some 1.47% in the rst period and 1.67% in the second pe-
riod) before reaching its new steady state level; and ii) that immediate
disination from a high (200%) ination has no output e¤ect.
Figure 2 sets out the case where disination is gradual (T = 6) and
focuses on disinating from a low (3%) initial ination rate. There are
two important features to note: i) the early output loss is less than that
under the immediate disination (now 0.2% in the rst period); and
ii) after the early fall in output, there is a substantive (compensatory)
output boom before a new steady state is reached4.
4Such disinationary booms are typically understood as follows. Under perfect
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Figure 2: Output E¤ect of Irelands (1997) Gradual Disination from a
Small(3%) Initial Annual Ination Rate.
Figure 3 presents the output e¤ect of disinating gradually (T = 6)
from a high (200%) initial ination rate. There is now a substantive early
output loss (27% below the initial steady state); and again an output
boom, but only part compensatory, before reaching the new steady state.
These benchmark images underlie the now well known policy conclu-
sion that high inations are best ended abruptly and low inations are
best ended gradually. The key issue is the impact on the real economy.
Three issues are important: (1) the extent of output losses in the early
periods after a monetary contraction; (2) the existence (or otherwise)
of a temporary output boom (dened as output rising above the new
steady state); and (3) whether early output losses are compensated over
some reasonable time horizon.
This paper goes on to explore these issues when the model assump-
tion of constant velocity is relaxed. We will see that introducing time
varying velocity to the modelling framework prompts us to modify our
stance on some of these issues.
credibility, agents are responding in advance of the change in policy, lowering their
relative prices, knowing that in future, ination is going to be lower. Because agents
set prices for two periods, and because ination will be lower in the future, they set
lower prices today, inducing a boom.
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Figure 3: Output E¤ect of Gradual Disination with Constant Velocity
V=1. Initial Annual Ination Rate 200%.
4 Output E¤ects of Immediate and Gradual Disin-
ation with Time Varying Velocity
Figure 4 sets out the output e¤ect of an immediate disination (T = 1)
from a low (3%) initial annual ination rate. Di¤erent values for  cap-
ture di¤erent degrees of time varying velocity ( = 0 reects the bench-
mark case discussed above and the (dotted) output path corresponds
to that seen in Figure 1. Higher values of  reect higher time varying
velocity. It is evident that the e¤ect of introducing velocity is to in-
crease the early output loss. To see why this comes about, we can refer
to the price setting strategies set out in equations (12) and (14). The
time varying velocity parameter (), enters the price setting strategies
for both types of rms and serves to induce rms to make larger adjust-
ment thereby augmenting the output e¤ect. This process is discussed in
more detail, after considering the output response to a gradual (T = 1)
disination from a low initial 3% ination rate.
In Figure 5, again, the dotted line reects the benchmark case when
velocity is constant ( = 0); as seen in Figure 2. As in the previous case
of immediate disination we see that introducing time varying velocity
to the model has induced greater output losses: the higher the value of ,
the lower the output falls below its initial steady-state level in the early
12
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Figure 4: Output E¤ect of Immediate Disination with Velocity Vt =

Ct . Initial Annual Ination Rate 3%.
period. However, in this case, velocity seems to have one more e¤ect. In
the benchmark case of gradual disination and constant velocity, we saw
that, after the initial fall, output not only picked up but also rose above
its new steady state level, staying above for some time before returning
to its new steady-state equilibrium (the output boom). However, for low
velocity levels  2 (0:01; 0:02) we see that, after the initial fall, output
recovers but never rises above the new steady state level. Moreover, this
is so for all yet higher values of delta. For any  >  output fails to
rise above the new steady-state level. Although output reaches its new
steady-state at about the same time (4-5 years) regardless of the velocity
parameter value (), the higher is velocity the greater is the output loss
and the greater is the possibility that there is no output boom. This
raises a key question about whether gradual disination is benecial.
With greater output losses for relatively high values of , there is the
possibility that they might not be compensated.
We obtain a crude measure of the overall impact on output by pro-
jecting forward 50 years. Table 2 provides the value of the area between
the output pathand the x axis: below the axis gives the output loss,
13
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Figure 5: Output E¤ect of Gradual Disination with Velocity Vt = 
Ct .
Initial Annual Ination Rate 3%.
and above the axis gives the outptu gain. The absolute size of the overall
impact is noted in the nal column. From Table 2, we can see that for
su¢ ciently high values of  the overall impact on output is negative. (If
we were to calculate the present values, overall net losses would arise at
lower levels of ).
 Loss Gain Overall Output
0 -0.42 7.79 7.36
0.001 -0.65 7.63 6.98
0.005 -1.72 7.19 5.47
0.01 -3.22 6.81 3.58
0.02 -6.60 6.42 -0.17
0.03 -10.22 6.30 -3.92
0.05 -17.56 6.21 -11.35
Table 2. Impact on output of a gradual disination from an initial
3% rate for di¤erent values of the velocity parameter ().
In the light of these results, Irelands (1997) conclusion that small
inations are best ended gradually may need to be qualied: it seems
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that even disinating a low ination gradually may be undesirable since
the overall impacton the real economy is negative. This shift in po-
tential policy conclusion is solely attributable to the introdution of time
varying velocity so it is helpful to discuss its role in the (behavioural)
context of the model. After the disination is announced at t = 0, at
t = 1 the rms that changed price last period now keep their price xed,
but the other set of rms respond by adjusting their prices. When they
solve their optimization problem to maximize their prots (see equations
(11) or (13) depending on the strategy they follow), rms take the ag-
gregate level of real money balances

Mt
Pt

as given (since the nominal
money supply Mt and the aggregate general level of prices Pt are taken
as given). In equilibrium, we know that

Mt
Pt

has to be consistent with
the individual rm choice. Thus, given

Mt
Pt

each optimal price pt(i),
for whatever strategy they chose to follow, has to be optimal for rm i,
and given each optimal price pt(i), Ct must equal

Mt
Pt
 1
1 
(see equa-
tion (5)). The role of  is important. When  > 0 we can see from
a simple manipulation of this expression how consumption responds to
disination. Taking logs one gets:
lnCt =
1
1   (lnMt   lnPt) :
Partially di¤erentiating with respect to Mt, yields
d lnCt
d lnMt
=
1
1   > 1: (16)
In a disinationary period, the induced fall in Ct is even greater than
when  = 0. The greater output loss is attributable to time varying
velocity. The price stickiness makes the velocity e¤ect on output more
persistent.
We now turn to consider the case where disination is from a high
(200%) initial ination rate. Figure 6 sets out the output path from both
an immediate disination and a gradual disination. There is no impact
of time varying veocity in the case of an immediate disination ( = 0
and  = 0:05 shown). At very high ination rates, both sets of rms
are following the two price strategy because the costs of adjustment are
outweighed by the benets. Not only is ination ended abruptly but
also, adjustment is so fast that there is no scope for velocity to have an
impact.
More interesting is the case of gradual disination. From Figure
6, the output path with time varying velocity ( = 0:05) looks very
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Figure 6: Output E¤ect of Immediate and Gradual Disination with
Velocity Vt = 
Ct . Initial Annual Ination Rate 200%.
similar to the benchmark case. However, in the rst period, the output
loss is more marked. The reason for this is akin to the output e¤ect
we have seen when disination was gradual from a low initial ination
rate. We have seen that when disination is gradual,  has a role to
play and its role is to reduce output more (see (16)). This reinforces
Irelands conclusion that gradual disination from a high initial rate is
not to be recommended. We therefore turn our attention to consider
gradual disination from a range of lower ination rates in more detail.
Specically, we quantify the e¤ect of time varying velocity on the optimal
speed of disination
5 Optimal Speed of Disination
An important choice for policy makers is the time horizon over which
they bring about price stability. Ireland (1997) gave clear guidance on
this issue: a high ination is best disinated immediately, whilst a low
ination is best disinated gradually. Furthermore, he calculated opti-
mal speeds of disination for a wide range of ination rates. Here, we
calculate the optimal speed of disination in our model which allows for
time varying velocity. We focus attention on a range of ination rates
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at the lower end of the range (1%-20%). We abstract from very high
ination rates because we know that immediate disination is the pre-
ferred policy response to a high ination rate and we have found that
time varying velocity has no output impact in the case of an immediate
disination from high ination rates. Furthermore, gradual disination
from a high initial ination rate is not to be recommended.
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Figure 7: Optimal Speed of Disination
Figure 7 presents the optimal speed of disination for (a selected sub-
set of) di¤erent values of . For each initial level of ination we calculate
the level of utility associated with di¤erent speeds of disination. Plotted
in Figure 7 is the benchmark case( = 0) and two other  > 0 values5.
For low values of , the optimal speed of disination is hardly changed
from the benchmark case. Yet for the higher velocity case shown, the
optimal speed of disination is decreased by approximately a year for
ination rates up to around 12%, and a half year for ination in the
teens. More generally, we can say that a more gradual period of disina-
tion is optimal for the entire range of inations from 1% to 20%. What
seems to be happening here is that higher velocity requires the policy
makers to disinate more slowly in order to put a brakeon the econ-
omy, moderating the greater output loss that we know would otherwise
5The calculations have been carried out for some 7 di¤erent values of : the
general story stays the same.
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result. This moderation serves to maximise utility.
6 Conclusion
Perhaps the most dramatic nding from recent research on monetary
contractions is that a gradual disination may bring about a disina-
tionary output boom. These disinationary output booms were rst
recorded in the much cited paper, Ball (1994); and the more recent
literature (in which rms are monopolistically competitive and there is
rigidity in prices) consistently nds such booms (see for example, Ireland
(1997), King and Wollman (1999), Khan, King and Wollman (2003)).
Common to the models used in these papers are the two assumptions:
perfect credibility and constant velocity. Nicolae and Nolan (2006) re-
lax the assumption of perfect credibility and nd that, whilst imperfect
credibility may make these booms disappear, it is not a su¢ cient condi-
tion: their (dis)appearance depends on the speed of learning relative to
the speed of disination. In this paper, we have relaxed the assumption
of constant velocity and we also nd that disinationary booms may dis-
appear, but now this is a result of time varying velocity: output boom
(dis)appearance depends on velocity.
This is not the only e¤ect of relaxing the constant velocity assump-
tion. For example, we nd that the early output loss that follows a
disinationary policy announcement is considerably larger when time
varying velocity is introduced to the model; and this output loss may
not be compensated by later output gains. As a result, we nd that, we
cannot unconditionally endorse Irelands policy recommendation that
small inations are best disinated gradually. We nd that a gradual
disination from a small ination may result in an overall output loss,
bringing into question the desirability of any disinationary policy ac-
tion in some cases. Finally, having introduced time varying velocity to
the model, calculations of the optimal speed of disination show that,
relative to Irelands calculations, a more gradual period of disination
is appropriate for those cases when gradual disination seems relevant.
It seems that some of the familiar results and policy implications from
inuential work on stopping inations are not robust to some modica-
tions of the modelling framework and further research is needed.
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